By Adv. Vinayak (Mama) D. Porob (Prabhu Punalekar)
The constitutional architecture of the justice delivery system rests upon two interdependent pillars, i.e., the authority of the judiciary and the independence of the legal profession. Advocates, recognised in law as officers of the court, occupy a position of trust that demands simultaneous fidelity to the client’s cause and unwavering respect for the institution of justice. Within this professional equilibrium arises a nuanced and frequently contested issue, i.e., the precise boundary at which the legitimate articulation of a grievance may be perceived as contempt of court.
The law of contempt serves a vital and constitutionally sanctioned purpose. It safeguards the dignity of courts, preserves public confidence in the administration of justice, and ensures that judicial proceedings remain free from obstruction or scandalisation. Yet, it is equally well-settled that the contempt jurisdiction is not intended to stifle fair criticism, suppress bona fide legal challenges, or intimidate members of the Bar from discharging their professional obligations with candour and courage.
An advocate’s duty extends beyond passive participation in proceedings. It includes the responsibility to identify procedural irregularities, question jurisdictional errors, seek recall or review of unjust orders, and, where necessary, pursue appellate or supervisory remedies. When such grievances are articulated in measured language, grounded in the record and advanced through recognised legal procedures, they constitute protected professional conduct intrinsic to the administration of justice itself.
The threshold into contempt is crossed not by the mere existence of criticism but by its character and consequence. Expressions that scandalise the court, attribute improper motives to judges without substantiation, employ intemperate or derogatory language, or attempt to influence pending proceedings through extraneous pressure undermine the rule of law and may justifiably invite contempt jurisdiction. Thus, the determinative factors remain intent, tone, and procedural propriety rather than dissent per se.
The majesty of the court is reflected in the quality of its reasoning and the transparency of its process, not in the frequent invocation of punitive authority. Correspondingly, the Bar bears an equally solemn obligation to ensure that advocacy never degenerates into personalisation or public disparagement, as professional freedom is sustainable only when exercised with restraint.
The principled course for an advocate, therefore, lies in fearless yet disciplined advocacy, raising grievances through affidavits, written submissions, statutory remedies, or administrative representation, confining criticism to the legality of action rather than the character of the adjudicator, and maintaining linguistic sobriety consistent with professional ethics. Such conduct simultaneously protects the client’s rights and reinforces the credibility of the justice system.
Ultimately, the relationship between the Bench and the Bar is not adversarial but constitutional in character—a partnership dedicated to the preservation of the rule of law. Contempt jurisdiction and professional independence operate not as competing doctrines but as complementary safeguards, ensuring that justice is administered with both authority and accountability.
In that balance resides a foundational principle of legal democracy. A grievance raised in good faith, through lawful means and with professional restraint, is an act of duty and not contempt.
Disclaimer: Personal opinion of the writer.
